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Abstract 
This paper investigates interactions between recreational and commercial fisheries. It 
introduces the idea of a protected area for recreational fisheries, as a way to reduce 
conflict between the two sectors and to preserve the natural resource. It is 
demonstrated that without a protected area for recreational fisheries, open access may 
imply that only one sector survives. A protected area can assure the operation of both 
sectors, even under open access. This measure also enhances the aggregate fish stock 
and the aggregate harvest, both in open access and in the optimal management of 
recreational fisheries, even if commercial fisheries operate under an open access 
regime. 
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Like commercial fisheries, the number of participants in recreational fisheries is 
significantly increasing around the world due to increases in wealth, leisure time, and 
tourism. In developed countries, 2.4% of the population participates in recreational 
fishing (e.g. Germany: 2.1%; USA: 2.8%; UK: 3.5% (freshwater only); Europe: 4.7%) 
(Pitcher and Hollingworth, 2002). In Nordic countries, the statistics for participation 
are: Denmark: 12.5%; Iceland: 31.5%; Sweden: 35%; Finland: 40%; Norway: 50% 
(Toivonen, 2002). In developing countries (e.g. South African line fisheries), only half 
of one percent of the population appears to be involved in fishing as a sport (Griffiths 
and Lamberth, 2002). The increasing number of participants in recreational fishing 
has placed pressure on marine resources. In Canada, there was evidence of dramatic 
declines in four high-profile fisheries, including 2 salmonid species, 1 percid species 
and 1 esocid species attributable to recreational fisheries (Post et al., 2002). In the 
United States, fish populations have declined in several coastal regions and 
recreational fisheries (in addition to commercial fisheries) were contributing to those 
declines (Coleman et al., 2004).  
 
Desire to preserve resources requires more understanding of management 
measures in recreational fisheries and the conflicts with commercial fisheries as well. 
In Australia, McPhee et al. (2002) suggest that, due to conflicts with commercial 
fisheries and without changes to the management and monitoring of recreational 
fisheries, resources may not be sustainable in the long term. Pitcher and Hollingworth 
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(2002) state that conflicts between recreational fisheries and commercial fisheries are 
notorious thus management decision should be taken with the presence of the 
information related to the aforementioned conflicts. Such conflicts are not always 
simple to define and they are a topic that has been studied by ecological fisheries and 
economic scientists (Pitcher and Hollingworth, 2002).  
 
Economic literature often deals with inefficient allocation of the resources 
under open access and it often examines efficient allocation that maximizes the 
present discounted value of recreational and commercial benefits (Connell and 
Sutinen, 1979). This research applied the bioeconomic model in the recreational 
context where angler demand is solely a function of the quantity of trips and the 
harvest per trip. It examined the allocation issue of a fishery, exploited by both 
recreational and commercial fishermen under open access and optimal management. 
Bishop and Samples (1980) consider the issue of the optimal harvest allocation of a 
fishery that is shared between commercial and recreational fisheries, by adding a 
recreational sector to a standard commercial fishing optimal control model. 
Laukkanen (2001) studied the optimal exploitation strategy for four sequential 
fisheries, of which one was a recreational fishery. Sumaila (2002) studied how the 
coexistence of sport and commercial fisheries in Namibian can be managed using the 
Nash equilibrium game theory.  
 
In this paper, we develop a bioeconomic model to address the competition and 
management of recreational and commercial fisheries. We study harvest strategies, 
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focusing on the allocation of catches between these fisheries. The benefits of both 
fisheries are measured in terms of catch rather than effort. We depart from Bishop’s 
model because we study recreational and commercial fisheries in a standard 
bioeconomic model. However, we investigate the open access management regime for 
both sectors as a base for further discussion. A consequence of open access in the two 
sectors is that one of the sectors may have to close down. We introduce a protected 
area for the recreational fishery as a measure to solve the conflict. The establishment 
of a protected area for the recreational fishery aims to protect and maintain the fishing 
ground for the recreational fishery and to reduce conflicts with the commercial fishery. 
Within a bioeconomic framework, we compare the aggregate stock and aggregate 
harvest before and after the establishment of a protected area for the recreational 
fishery. This is done to see if it helps to achieve equity in spatial resource allocation 
for participants. The comparison is also useful in examining how a protected area can 
contribute to a fishery management objective. We also suggest using the protected 
area as a management tool for recreational fisheries since, as for marine reserves, this 
may be easier to enforce and the data requirement for effective management may be 
low compared to other management schemes (Pezzey et al., 2000). To the best of our 
knowledge, the protected area modeling of recreational–commercial fisheries is novel. 
  
Whether or not a protected area for recreational fisheries is established, the 
commercial fishery, by assumption, operates under open access conditions. Several 
investigations regarding the open access commercial fishery with the presence of a no-
take marine reserve have been conducted (see e.g. Flaaten and Mjolhus (2006); 
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Pezzey et al. (2000); Sanchirico and Wilen (2001)). These papers have analyzed and 
focused directly on the cost and benefits of a marine reserve for fisheries management. 
The open access regime is chosen to examine whether a marine reserve can create 
social and ecological benefits and work as a management tool, instead of applying 
conventional tools, such as fish quotas, effort licenses, seasonal closures, and gear 
restrictions.   
 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic bioeconomic model 
is presented and we explore recreational–commercial fisheries’ conflicts and 
management, when the recreational fishery is without a protected area. In Section 3, 
we analyze the interaction between recreational and commercial fisheries when the 
protected area is established for the recreational fishery. In Section 4, we compare 
different management regimes, the aggregate stock, and aggregate harvest, before and 
after the creation of a protected area for the recreational fishery. Finally, in Section 5, 
we conclude the paper with a discussion of its findings. 
 
2. The basic model 
 
In this section, we consider the characteristics of a basic fishery model without the 
protected area. We assume that a fish stock is located in an area unit size and that the 
natural growth rate for fish population exhibits logistic growth pattern, thus 
  




where  is the size of fish population, S r  is the intrinsic growth rate. It should be 
noted that carrying capacity is normalized to one and  SG  is a strictly concave 





 1 ,      (2) 
g  and  are the harvests from recreational and commercial fisheries respectively.  h
 
Above, equation (2) is the ecological model, which shows the relationship 
between the harvest and the change in stock biomass. However, the harvest activity is 
also determined by economic considerations. In order to develop the main analysis, 
we will provide a simple model, which allows for the economic analysis of a fishery, 
jointly exploited by recreational anglers and commercial fishermen. Since the utility 
of recreational anglers does not relate directly to fish consumed (as it does with 
commercial fisherman) we will use in this study the benefit function for both 
recreational and commercial fisheries. 
 
Following Bishop and Samples (1980), we assume that  Sv  is the gross benefit 
per unit of fish caught by recreational anglers,   0' Sv , and  Sj  is the average cost 
of catching fish in the recreational fishery,   0' Sj . Thus   vS  SjS  R   is the net 
benefit per unit of fish caught recreationally, where   0SR' .The demand for 
recreational catch is perfectly elastic with respect to g . Bishop and Samples (1980) 
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measured the success of anglers by the fish catch per day and they assumed that the 
catch per day is positively related to the stock size; so the gross benefit per unit of fish 
caught is a function of stock. Below we assume that ν(S) is proportional to S. 
 
For the commercial fishery, let p be the price per unit of commercial catch, 
where demand is assumed to be perfectly elastic and  Sc  be the cost of catching per 
unit of fish caught . Hence   0' Sc    ScpSC   is the rent, or benefit per unit, of 
fish caught commercially. Note that demands for recreational and commercial catches 
are perfectly elastic and effort costs are linear in effort; thus, there is no consumer 
surplus or producer surplus generated in our analysis. 
 
2.1 Open access equilibrium 
 
Open access, bioeconomic equilibrium occurs when there is no incentive for 
individuals to enter or to leave the fishery. In this case, there is simultaneously 
economic and biological equilibrium, with the aggregate harvest equaling the fish 
growth. The open access bioeconomic equilibrium of a joint recreational and 
commercial fishery only occurs in this model when the benefit from recreational 
fishery is zero and, simultaneously, the rent from commercial fishery is zero. The 
open access equilibrium point is implicitly defined by 
 
  0gSR ,         (3) 
  0hSC ,         (4) 
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  01  hgSrS
dt
dS
.       (5) 
 
(3) and (4) imply that each sector will approaches the open access equilibrium 
when they harvest the stock to their zero net benefit level. Thus, a general equilibrium 
requires that the net benefit functions of both sectors simultaneously equal zero. For 
the purpose of further analysis, we assume the net benefit functions for recreational 









pSC C ,        (7) 
where a , , Rc p  and  are parameters. Cc
 
The open access condition for the fisheries can be obtained by setting (6) and (7) 
equal to zero. However, the difference in cost efficiency may lead to interactions 
between the two sectors. The activity of the commercial fishery may affect the 
recreational fishery and vice versa. In order to examine this interaction, it is useful to 
investigate first the open access equilibrium stock levels for fish, solely exploited by a 










 .         (9) 
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(8) and (9) are open access stock levels of recreational fisheries and commercial 
respectively. If the fish stock exceeds  
a
cR  or 
p
cC , additional anglers or fishermen 
would be attracted to the fishery. The effort will increase and make the stock decrease 
to the open access level of each fishery. Anglers or fishermen may continue to fish 
until the net benefit is down to zero or until the stock level approaches equation (8) for 
recreational fisheries or equation (9) for commercial fisheries.  
 
By contrast, when the population is exploited by both recreational and 
commercial fisheries, there will be conflicts between them. Both recreational anglers 
and commercial fishermen will compete for the fishing areas and fishing harvests. 
One significant question arisen here is: what is the equilibrium point in this joint 
fishery? There are three possibilities; the two fisheries are equally cost efficient, the 
commercial fishery is most cost efficient, or the recreational fishery is most cost 
efficient. The present analysis will go through each possibility and examine how the 
conflicts between two sectors may affect the equilibrium stock and harvest of the 
fisheries. 
 






S RC  ,        (10) 
it is immediately clear that the general open access stock equilibrium of a joint 
commercial and recreational fishery can be achieved. At this stock level, both sectors 
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rhg CCRR 11 .     (11) 
 
Equation (10) is a strict constraint for a general equilibrium. A change of one of 
the parameters can violate this constraint and it is possible that either the recreational 
anglers or the commercial fishermen have to leave the fishery. 
 





S CR  . In this case, the recreational fishery is more 
advanced than the commercial fishery, in the sense that its combined technology, costs, 
and market values put more pressure on the stock than that of the commercial fishery. 
The commercial fishermen will have to leave the fishery. The fishery is only exploited 












rSrSg RR 11 .     (12) 
 





S RC  . The net benefit from the harvest of 
recreational fisheries is negative. Thus, in contrast with ii), the recreational anglers 
will leave the fishery. The fishery is solely exploited by commercial fishermen so the 
















Both recreational and commercial harvests cannot exceed the catchable stock 
(the natural growth rate of the fish stock). Although the equilibrium harvest in both 
cases (i) and (ii) equals the natural growth rate of the fish stock, the harvest of 
commercial fishermen in case (ii) is different from that of recreational anglers in case 
(i). The reason for this is due to the difference in cost efficiency. The difference in the 
cost affects the level of equilibrium fish stock and in turn, affects the harvest rate. Our 
fish stock in coastal oceans is more likely to be overexploited than underexploited. 
Consequently, a higher cost may lead to an increase in the fish stock and this in turn, 
makes the equilibrium harvest also increase. The magnitude of the harvest of two 
sectors therefore depends mostly on the magnitude of the cost exerting from their 
activities. 
  
i) and ii) are cases where a general equilibrium point for both sectors cannot be 
achieved. The open access combination of recreational and commercial fishing does 
not assure the operation of both sectors. The question of how to manage each sector, 
provided the other sector operates under open access, will be studied. As the 
commercial fishery, by assumption, always operates under open access conditions, we 
will discuss appropriate management measures for a recreational fishery to achieve an 
equilibrium with the harvest in both sectors.   
 
2.2 Management strategies for a recreational fishery with competition from an open 




As discussed above, open access for both fisheries’ sectors gives rise to three cases; 
coexistence of the two fisheries, commercial fisheries only, or recreational fisheries 
only.  In the first case, due to equilibrium open access stock levels of two sectors are 
equal to each other, the operation strategy would be to allow open-access regimes in 
both fisheries. Here, we will only examine the last two cases in order to investigate the 
appropriate management strategy for the recreational fishery, assuming that the 
commercial fishery remains as an open-access fishery. 
 
i) The recreational fishery is more efficient than commercial fishery,    CR SS
Maybe we should not expect to find it in actual fisheries. Since, if the 
recreational fishery were more efficient than the commercial fishery, then rational 
commercial fishermen would change and use the same fishing technology as the 
recreational anglers. Nevertheless, let us assume that the manager’s problem is 
whether to choose a management plan for the recreational fishery, with the constraint 
that there exists an actual or possible open-access commercial fishery with the 




 .  
 
We assume that the manager uses the optimal strategy, which follows from 
maximizing the present value of the recreational fishery benefit. We know from Clark 
and Munro (1975) that, in the case of an autonomous model with harvest that is linear 
in effort, there exists a long run optimal steady state and the optimal path towards 
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steady state is the most rapid approach. Thus, we proceed by focusing on the optimal 
steady state. The objective function is then given by 
 






    hgSG
dt
dS
,        (15) 
 ,         (16) maxgg 0
 ,         (17)   00 SS 
where   is social discount rate and  is a constraint on the harvest capacity of the 
recreational sector. Constraint (17) is an initial condition, that at ,  S  stands at 





The objective of this problem is to choose an optimal control  for all t such 
that  is maximized without exceeding the natural growth rate of the fish stock. The 




      hgSGgSReH t  ,      (18) 
           hSGgSRe t  , 
where   is the current value shadow price. It is also known as the adjoint variable. 
The adjoint equation is defined by  
            SGgSRe
S
H ''t   






Since the Hamiltonian is linear in control variable g , the switching function 
will determine the optimal level of catch for the recreational anglers in the fishery. 
The switching function is defined by         SRet t . Thus, if   0t ,  and 
if 
maxgg 
  0t , . In the case 0g   0t , the recreational harvest is on the singular path. 
Clark and Munro (1975) show that the vanish of switching function implies an 
singular solution for  that can be stated by the following equation S
















SG .      (20) 
*
RS  is the optimal level of the fish stock if the recreational fishery is optimal along the 
time path.  
 
Equation (20) is obtained from evaluating the singular time path 
 and the adjoint equation. This equation is also known as golden 
rules in the fishery. It states that the optimal stock level for the recreational fishery is 
the level that maximizes the benefit. The presence of an open access commercial 
fishery impacts on the fish stock and, naturally, it impacts on the management strategy 
for the recreational fishery. The optimal harvest policy for recreational fisheries will 
depend on the open access stock level for commercial fisheries. Thus, the optimal 
approach for the recreational fishery to the general equilibrium can be stated as 
    0    SRet t
 
































 , the harvest rate will drive the stock maxg p
c
S C  toward  and 
the commercial fishermen would have to exit the fishery. This result contradicts the 
assumption that the commercial fishery may operate under open access conditions. On 








  implies that there is no participation of recreational 
anglers in the fishery. Only at the steady state equilibrium of 
p
c
S C*R   may the two 
sectors coexist in the fishery. The commercial fishery operates under its open access 
condition while the recreational fishery operates under some form of management 
restriction that allows . Note that this implies a need for a mechanism 




The steady state optimal solution may be achieved by use of harvest or effort 
control, as well as fees (Clark, 2005). For the recreational fishery, Connell and 
Sutinen (1979) suggest that in order to obtain the optimal harvest in the steady state, 
the manager can impose a user fee per unit of harvest. In this paper, the user fee is 
determined by setting switching function equal to zero and it is equal to  . 
Following Clark (2005), p. 315,  can be solved from adjoint equation (20) as 
te
te
   
 
 


























 .    (22) 
 
The application of the user fee implies that the recreational anglers will adjust 
their activity until the net benefit equal to . At this point, the harvest of te
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recreational anglers would be optimal. The user fee is determined by the steady state 
stock and the open access catch level from commercial fisheries, and at this level, it 
stays constant. If the cost–price ratio 
p
cC  of the commercial fishery increases, the 
commercial harvest may decrease or increase. This depends on whether the stock is 
biologically underexploited or overexploited. If the stock is biological overexploited, 
an increase in cost–price ratio,
p
cC  leads to an increase in commercial harvest. In this 
case, the steady stock increases and the user fee decreases. If the stock is biological 
underexploited, an increase in cost–price ratio 
p
cC  leads to a decrease in commercial 
harvest. In this situation, the steady state stock increases and the user fee also 
increases. 
 
(ii) The recreational fishery is less efficient than the commercial fishery,    RC SS
In this case, the recreational anglers will not participate in the fishery since the 
stock level at open access is too low. Under this scheme, the spatial zoning approach 
is an appropriate management tool that can secure the operation of recreational 
fisheries since it provides the security for recreational fisheries through exclusion of 
commercial fisheries. Also, in relation to case (i) , spatial zoning can be used 
for a similar purpose – to allow the two fisheries to coexist.  
  RC SS
 




The theory of spatial zoning focuses on the selection of a protected area and its 
size. There are two core objectives that motivate the creation of protected areas: 
conservation and sustainable provisions for human use (Kar and Matsuda, 2008). The 
second goal, relating to human use, includes the management of fisheries, recreation, 
education, and research. Therefore, there are many different types of protected areas, 
with different levels of protection, ranging from areas that allow certain extraction 
activity to those that are strictly no-take reserves. Bohnsack (1993) argues that a 
protected area reduces conflicts between user groups by physically separating the 
interests of fisheries and non-fisheries. In this paper, we introduce a protected area for 
the recreational fishery as a measure to reduce conflicts between recreational and 
commercial fisheries by separating the fishing grounds into two. There are some 
examples of zoning mechanisms like this in Australia. Here, the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park has some zones that allow recreational use only. In New South Wales, 30 
Recreational Fishing Havens have been established utilizing fisheries management 
closures that exclude commercial fishing (Rayns et al., 2006). In this section, we will 
discuss how a protected area for recreational fisheries may assist in resource allocation 
for recreational anglers, and how the aggregate stock and harvests are affected by a 
protected area.   
 
Most bioeconomic models of protected areas are developed to examine the 
effects of protected areas (normally no-take reserves) on commercial fisheries. Our 
model is designed to analyze the impact on recreational and commercial fishing of a 
protected area for recreational fisheries. The common approach in the bioeconomic 
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models is to divide the marine environment into two patches, one for protection, and 
one for fishing. In our case, a protected area for recreational fisheries segregates the 
fishing activities of two sectors in two different fishing grounds. The commercial 
fishermen only fish outside the protected area. We will consider the relationship 
between these different groups; recreational anglers and the commercial fishermen. 
 
The creation of a protected area for a recreational fishery leads to a fraction 
of the total area of unit size that must be set aside for the recreational fishery; and 
 is the area for the commercial fishery. Since the recreational sector operates 
inside the protected area and the commercial sector operates in the outer area, we 








SG and  
mC
SG  as the natural growth 
rates of the population inside and outside the protected area. The natural growth rates 




























1 .       (24) 
 Assuming that the migration between the protected area and the outside area 
occurs, the rates of change in biomass, inside and outside the protected area, are 
modeled as follows 


















,     (25) 


















,     (26) 
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where z  is the migration rate,  is the recreational harvest and  is the commercial 
harvest after the protected area is established. These two dynamic equations will be 
used to analyze firstly, the open-access equilibrium, then the optimal management of 
the recreational fishery within this reserve framework.  
mg mh
 
3.1. Open access equilibrium 
 
Although the participants of the two sectors are exploited in the different patches and 
in the different fish stocks, the question of how to allocate the total harvest and the 
resource between recreational fisheries and commercial fisheries is of interest. There 
are some key reasons for this. First, there is a biological linkage between the two 
patches due to the dispersal of fish between them; so the rate of change of the fish 
stock will involve the growth of the fish stock and the dispersal process. Second, the 
way to allocate the resource will have consequences on the sustainability of the stock, 
the amount of market value from the resource, and the social and environmental 
objectives of the fisheries (Sumaila, 2002). 
  
The benefits for recreational anglers and commercial fishermen are defined as 
  mR gSR m  and   mC hSC m , respectively. The open access dissipates the benefits (rents) of 
the two sectors. To examine the open access regime for both sectors and to investigate 
the problem of the fishery in relation to the creation of the protected area for 









































.       (28) 
 
The open access equilibrium stocks in the two patches can be defined by setting 





 ,         (29) 




 1 .        (30) 
 
Equation (29) and equation (30) show that an expansion of the protected area 
directly affects the open access equilibrium sub-stock. It increases the open access 












 , the open access equilibrium stock in both patches will 
























 , then 
.  can be seen as a resource allocation parameter. The choice of m  may 
impact on the stock level for recreational and commercial fishing and consequently, it 







If we substitute the open access stocks from (29) and (30) into (25) and (26) 
and let them equal zero, the equilibrium harvests for recreational and commercial 
fisheries, which include two components, the natural growth rate, and the migration 
























rg CRRRm 1 ,     (31) 























rh CRCCm 11 .     (32) 
where  and  are the equilibrium harvests for recreational and commercial 
fisheries with the creation of the protected area under open access condition, 
respectively. The aggregate harvest can be obtained by adding (31) and (32) and it 
equals combining natural growth rate of the fish stock inside and outside the protected 
area. The aggregate harvest therefore gives the relationship between the fish 






There is an interaction between two sectors, which may affect the harvest of 
each sector. Fishing activity, inside and outside the protected area, reduces stock 
density. The relative density of the population will determine the dispersal between 
the two patches. Thus, even fishing in different fishing grounds, the activity of 
commercial fishermen may affect that of recreational anglers and vice versa. If the 
biological parameters r  and  are assumed as given, then both the recreational and 
commercial harvest become a function of economic parameters 
z
p
cC  and 
a
cR . An 
increase in the cost of commercial fishing will make the stock outside the protected 
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area increase. This may help the recreational harvest increase due to the benefit from 
the dispersal from the outer area into the protected area. 
 
From (31) and (32), it can be seen that both sectors may coexist when the 
protected area is created even if they operate under open access condition and if they 
are different in cost efficiency. However, it should be noted that the open-access 
steady state harvest from one of two fisheries may still be zero. When the growth rate 
in the protected area is equal to, or less than, the emigration from the protected area to 
the outer area, the recreational fishing must cease. When the growth rate of the outer 
area is equal to, or less than, emigration from the outer area to the protected area, 
commercial fishing must cease. This makes sense, as the migration exceeding the 
natural growth seems unable to sustain the ecological equilibrium with positive stock 
within each patch. 
 
The commercial and recreational fisheries, under open access, imply that the 
establishment of protected areas, with an open access regime for commercial fishing 
outside and especially recreational fishing inside, still result in inefficiencies. The 
fishermen and the anglers continue to increase their efforts until their benefit equals 
zero. Further, because of the dispersal between the two patches, the aggregate stock 
will be fished down. It is assumed that  is open access stock inside the protected 
area that makes the net benefit of anglers equal to zero. A level of  will make 
the net benefit for recreational fisheries positive, so it will attract more anglers 











dispersal of fish from the protected area to the fishing ground also increases. This can 
lead to the equilibrium catch of commercial fishermen,  increasing and therefore, 




3.2 Optimal management of the recreational fisheries and open access for the 
commercial fisheries 
 
Now we assume that the recreational fishery is managed to maximize the resource rent 





 1  . To formalize the objective function of the manager we write formally 




       (33) 
subject to 















 ,      (34) 
max
mgg 0 ,         (35) 
  00 SS mR  .         (36) 
 
The current-value Hamiltonian is 






















 ,    (37) 























with  as the control variable, where ;  is state variable;mg
max
mgg 0 mRS   is adjoint 
variable, or shadow value of the population stock inside the protected area; and 
mR
S
 is social discounted rate.  
 
The adjoint equation in this case is 



















  .    (38) 
 
As previously, a singular solution only arises when the coefficient of  (the 
switching function, 
mg
       
mR
t
m SRet ) is zero. The optimal equilibrium stock if the 
recreational fishery is optimal along the time path is found from evaluating singular 
path and adjoint equation as follows 
 









































   (39) 
where  
mR
' SR  and  
mR
' SG  are representative of partial derivatives of the net benefit 
function and the growth function for the protected area, with respect to the stock 
population. 
 
 The golden rule (39) can be explained the following way. The first component 













S . The second component, 
 






























m , is the marginal stock 
effect emanating from the recreational fisheries. Therefore, (39) states that the optimal 
stock for recreational fisheries, , is one at which the sum of the marginal product 
of the stock and the marginal stock effect equals the social rate of discount. Clark and 
Munro (1975) called this sum the own rate of interest of the stock. In this case, both 
the marginal productivity of the stock and the growth term of the marginal stock effect 
are adjusted for migration. The golden rule (39) equalizes the own rate of interest of 





Equation (47) may be rewritten as 


























The left-hand side of (40) is the present value of the marginal sustainable 
benefit afforded by the marginal increment to the stock. Also, it can be interpreted as 
the marginal user cost – the cost of capturing the marginal increment of fish. The 
right-hand side is the marginal benefit from recreational fishing. Hence, the optimal 
fish stock  is defined by equalizing the present value of the marginal user cost and 





Without the presence of protected area, the optimal strategy for recreational 
fisheries as we study in case (i) of previous section shows that at the steady state, 
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 *RSG  is allocated to recreational fisheries as a rate of   and to commercial fisheries 
at a rate of such that the net benefit of recreational fisheries equals  and the 
net benefit of commercial fisheries equals zero. The conflict between two sectors still 
exists. One of two sectors may be excludes if the level of fish stock falls below the 




The creation of protected area for recreational fisheries helps to segregate the 
areas for recreational and commercial fishing. Thus  *RmSG  is only allocated for 
recreational fisheries and the activity of the recreational fisheries is assured. It is the 
same for commercial fisheries. The commercial harvest is assured by the natural 
growth rate  
mC
SG  outside the protected area. The interaction between two sectors is 
only due to the dispersal process which depends on the density of the fish stock 
between the two parches.  
 
The net benefit of recreational fisheries so far, has been studied as a function of 
economic parameters and the stock level inside the protected area. Let us investigate, 
in this case, how the net benefit of recreational fisheries affected by the fish stock 
inside and outside the protected area and by other relevant factors. The benefit from 
the recreational fisheries solved from (40) is given by 
 











































As opposed to the open access solution that drives the stock to the zero net 
benefit level. Optimal management solution requires a reduction of harvest from 
recreational fisheries to where the benefit function satisfies (41). The net benefit of 
recreational fisheries is a function of cost–price ratio, 
p
cC of commercial fisheries and 
other biological parameters in both areas. It increases with the cost–price ratio and the 
intrinsic growth rate and decreases with the migration rate. This illustrates that the 
benefit of recreational fisheries is dependent on the dispersal between two patches; so 
it will depend on relative densities and hence, cost–price ratio outside the protected 
area. In contrast with the case without the protected area, the benefits in this case thus, 
must be considered in a system of ecologically-connected patches. Removing one unit 
from the stock, inside or outside the protected area, will affect spillover to another 
patch.  
 
From (39) we can also obtain the steady state harvest for recreational fisheries 
as a function of the net benefit, marginal growth rate of fish stock and discounted rate 

















   .      (42) 
 
The net benefit of harvested fish is an increase function of  thus, when 











3.3 User fee for the recreational fisheries and open access for the commercial 
fisheries  
 
Instead of quantitative implementation of the optimal management for the recreational 
fisheries, the manager may impose a fee , on each unit of recreationally-
caught fish. This will result in a steady state optimal fishery. From the switching 




t SRe  .  
 
The user fee can help the manager obtain optimal fishery management since the 
benefit function of recreational fishing, with the effect of the user fee, now becomes 
     mtRmtmR geSRgegSR mm    .     (43) 
 
The recreational anglers stop entering the fishery when the net benefit vanishes, 
so it is easy to see that  
  0 tR eSR m .        (44) 
 
(44) is the same as the switching function in the singular path. The application 
of this user fee may adjust the level of recreational harvest to the optimal level even if 
the recreational fishery operates under open access condition. To examine the effects 
of the biological and economic parameters on the change of user fee , (following 











































 .    (45) 
 
Equation (45) corresponds with  
mR
SR  in (41).  The optimal fee to be imposed 
on recreational fishing depends on the cost–price ratio of commercial fishing, the 
reserve size, and the migration rate. A high cost–price ratio and a high reserve size 
make the user fee increase, while a high migration rate works in the opposite way.   
is the user cost of fish stock;   is zero if the growth of fish stock  equals the 
dispersal from the protected area to the outer area, or if the stock is so abundant that 




  0*R' mSR ). This implies that the change in  can impact on the user cost mRS  . 
increases, causing increases in natural growth of the fish stock and net benefit 
from fishing.  Consequently, 
mR
S
  increases and the user fee on recreational fishing also 
increases.  
 
Protected areas may help to maintaining the fishing opportunities for both 
recreational anglers and commercial fishermen since they separate fishing areas and in 
turn, this may reduce the costly conflicts between the users. However, if the fishery is 
unregulated, this may lead to a divergence between private and social benefits and 
costs. Consequently, protected areas cannot contribute to maintaining healthy fish 
populations. This point raises a need to develop, implement and enforce management 
measures after zoning. While the commercial fishery is difficult to control especially 
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with the case of multispecies and small-scale fishery in developing countries, 
combination of protected areas and the imposition of the user fee on recreational 
fisheries may be an appropriate measure to manage and maintain the fish stock. 
 
4. Comparisons before and after the creation of the protected area 
 
To better understand and explain the role of the protected area for recreational 
fisheries, we should examine the aggregate stock and aggregate harvest increase when 
the protected area for recreational fishing is created. We will therefore compare the 
result, as regards stock size and harvest, before and after the establishment of the 
protected area for recreational fisheries. This comparison will show how the protected 
area can affect the operation of the two sectors and of the equilibrium point.  
 
Table 1 presents the comparisons of the aggregate stock and aggregate harvests 
before and after creation of a protected area under open access condition for both 
recreational and commercial fisheries. The establishment of a protected area sets up 
possibilities for increases in aggregate stock and aggregate harvests. Whether the 
stock densities inside and outside the protected area are equal or not, the aggregate 
stock biomass and aggregate harvests after the creation of the protected area, are at 






Table 1 – Comparisons of aggregate equilibrium stock and harvests before and 
after the creation of a protected area under open access condition for both 
sectors 
 
   No protected area, open access  Protected area, open access 
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In order to be able to address effectiveness of different management regimes 
for recreational fisheries after the creation of protected area, we make comparisons of 
aggregate stock and aggregate harvests between open access and optimal management 
regime for recreational fisheries. Table 2 displays these comparisons.  
 







RR SSS mm 
  0 . Only if the future is completely discounted 
(  ), the optimal strategy is to exploit the stock to the level of bionomic 
equilibrium of the unregulated, open access fishery.  
 
The optimal management for recreational fisheries enhances the stock inside a 
protected area; consequently, an aggregate stock also increases compared to open 
access situation. The magnitude of the aggregate harvests will depend on the 
magnitude of the stock level inside the protected area for recreational fisheries. When 
the optimal management is actually applied, the population inside a protected area for 
recreational fisheries increases and it begins to create a positive benefit for 
commercial fisheries, by dispersal flow. The harvest for open access commercial 
fisheries may be higher than that under open access for recreational fisheries. 







Table 2 – Comparisons of aggregate equilibrium stock and harvests between 
open access and optimal management regime for the recreational fisheries with 
creation of protected area 
 
Variables          Aggregate stock    Aggregate harvests             
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Optimal management  
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1
 is the optimal stock level for a recreational fishery defined by (39).  *RmS
 
i)  If 
2
m
SS *RR mm 
 , the aggregate harvest will increase, compared to the 
open access regime for recreational fisheries. 







 , the aggregate harvest will decrease compared to the 
open access regime for recreational fisheries. 




, the problem is more complex. The aggregate harvest 
will either increase or decrease compared to the open access condition for recreational 






5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper discusses a bioeconomic model of recreational and commercial fisheries 
and asks a pertinent question: in an open access fishery, can an area reserved for the 
exclusive use of one of two sectors maintain the co-existence of both recreational and 
commercial fisheries? Since the recreational anglers and commercial fishermen 
compete for the same fish, the allocation of all or part of the resource to one group, 
impacts on the resources available to the other group. Under open access, each sector 
harvests the stock to the level where the net benefit of each fishery is dissipated, so the 
open access solution may occur with one or both of the sectors. The participants in 
one of the sectors may have to leave the fishery (or they never enter it) if they are less 
efficient. Competition between the two sectors implies that the fishery should be 
managed jointly in a sustainable manner.  
 
This paper provides the idea for the creation of a protected area for recreational 
fisheries, which helps to redistribute recreational and commercial fishing activities 
onto different locations. However, aligning the management systems used for different 
sectors can be challenging due to the differing objectives and mechanisms. In addition, 
particular management policy will affect participants’ behavior differently and, in turn, 
will affect the aggregate stock and harvest differently. In this paper, we applied a 
typical analysis under different management regimes. This analysis consisted of a 
comparison between the harvest and stock biomass levels before and after the creation 




The comparison showed that the establishment of the protected area for 
recreational fisheries can ensure that both sectors can participate in the fisheries and 
resolve the conflicts amongst participants, from the two sectors. Protected areas 
enhance both the aggregate harvests and the aggregate stock biomass, even when both 
sectors still operate under open access conditions. The application of optimal 
management regimes for recreational fisheries can help to increase the aggregate stock. 
The aggregate harvests, under optimal management regimes, may be either higher 
than, or smaller than those under protected areas, for open access recreational fisheries, 






The protected area for recreational fishing can help the fishery manager achieve 
optimal and sustainable use of the marine resource. This involves making equal use of 
the resource, considering the commercial fisheries always operate under open access 
conditions. However, a natural problem that arises from this situation is that the 
establishment of a protected area for recreational fisheries can lead to increased 
opposition from commercial fishermen. This opposition occurs because commercial 
fishermen are more efficient, and do not like losing their important fishing grounds; 
how managers deal with this problem is an important factor to consider. At this point 
we will consider  Smith and Pollard (1996) , p.262 view of management: 
“Fisheries management should aim to achieve optimal and ecologically 
sustainable utilisation of the living aquatic resources.” 
 And they clarified concerns of fisheries management:   
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“This involves making the best possible use of the aquatic environment, 
considering all of the values and uses to which it can be put, from fishing 
of all kinds (commercial, recreational and traditional) to non-capture uses 
such as those of conservation, tourism and development.” 
From previous analysis, we know that managers can impose a fee on 
recreational fisheries in order to obtain optimal stock level. From a regulatory 
perspective, they could transfer this fee to commercial fishermen as compensation for 
their loss of fishing ground. In addition, the dispersal of stock biomass from a 
protected area to an outer area is also evidence of a benefit to commercial fishermen, 
which could convince them to support the creation of a protected area for recreational 
fisheries.  
 
Conflicts between commercial and recreational fisheries increase globally and 
create challenges for fisheries’ managers (Aas, 2007). This is primarily because each 
sector fails to recognize the impacts of their own activity on the other sectors and 
because recreational and commercial fisheries have been traditionally managed in 
isolation from each other. From our research, it is clear that only when we have a 
better understanding of recreational fisheries and their relationship with commercial 
fisheries, can we formulate more effective management plans to conserve and sustain 
the fish resources.  
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